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WILL THE REAL REASONABLE PERSON 
PLEASE STAND UP? USING PSYCHOLOGY TO 
BETTER UNDERSTAND How JURIES 
INTERPRET AND APPLY THE REASONABLE 
PERSON STANDARD 
Ashley M. Votruba * 
First, a thought experiment. Imagine yourself as the prototypical person 
sitting on a jury in a negligence case. Normally, you would be going about 
your busy week working, taking care of your family, and trying to find a 
little time for enjoyment, but this week is unusual. This week you were 
selected to be one of a small group of people chosen to make a difficult and 
essential decision. Is the defendant guilty? Should the plaintiff be 
compensated for her injuries? At this point, you have been sitting in the 
same courthouse for hours on end, presented with a never-ending flood of 
information. You have heard from a sympathetic plaintiff, who has clearly 
been injured and is now struggling; a defendant, who seems to make logical 
and reasonable claims regarding his innocence; and countless experts, who 
spew nearly unintelligible technical information. It has been a long and 
confusing week with each side presenting a similar story but with their own 
conflicting interpretations. 
It is finally nearing the end of the trial, and the judge provides the jury 
instructions for the first time. 1 You attempt to rally your wavering focus in 
order to fully absorb what the judge is saying. Amid the highly technical, 
jargon-filled instructions, the judge seems to emphasize what he refers to as 
the negligence standard. He states negligence occurs when: 
the person fails to exercise ordinary care. "Ordinary ca[r]e" is the 
care a reasonable person would use in similar circumstances. A 
person is negligent if the person, without intending to do harm, 
does something ( or fails to do something) a reasonable person 
* Executive Articles Editor, Arizona State Law Journal; J.D./Ph.D. student at the Sandra 
Day O'Connor College of Law and Arizona State University; M.A., Social Psychology, Arizona 
State University, 2013; B.S., Psychology, Arizona State University, 2009. 
1. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent 
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77 (1988) Gury instructions occur after the trial is 
complete). 
First published by Arizona State Law Journal, Volume 45, Issue 2.
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would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or 
damage to a person or property.2 
You and the rest of the jury retire to another room and begin 
deliberations. As a jury, you all discuss the case and the ultimate question: 
was the defendant negligent? According to the jury instructions, you must 
consider whether the defendant acted as the "reasonable person." In other 
words, you should consider whether the defendant used "ordinary care" 
given the circumstances. But as a lay juror-who hasn't spent hours sitting 
in a Tort class or pouring over legal scholarship-what exactly does that 
mean? What factors should you use to make your decision given the 
vagueness of the jury instructions? 
Scholars and legal theorists have attempted to make sense of the 
common law principle of the Reasonable Person Standard as a basis for 
determining negligent liability in order to better understand the implications 
of the standard and recommend improvements.3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
suggested that the Reasonable Person Standard was a means of asking the 
jury if the outcome was foreseeable based on the defendant's conduct and 
the circumstances.4 Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.,5 articulated the Hand Formula, a cost-benefit styled analysis which 
determines negligent liability by weighing the size of the loss of an 
accident, the probability that the accident would occur, and the cost of 
taking preventative measures. 6 Other legal theorists have conceptualized the 
Reasonable Person Standard as asking the jury to apply community norms, 
whether moral or safety norms, to the defendant's actions. 7 Each of these 
perspectives, and others that proliferate throughout the legal literature, are 
crucial to the understanding and conceptualization of the theory of 
negligence. They add unique perspectives to the discussion of the social 
relevance of the concept of negligence. But, in terms of understanding the 
actual application of the negligence standard by the jury, these perspectives 
provide minimal insight. 
2. KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 120.02 
(6th ed. 2012). 
3. See infra Part III. 
4. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A 
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 591 (2001) (citing OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 87-88 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Little, Brown 
1963) (188 I)). 
5. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
6. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). 
7. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 591-92. 
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Jurors are given the difficult task of deciding whether a defendant was 
negligent in cases where liability is often unclear.8 Focusing specifically on 
the negligence component of a tortious claim, jurors must decide the facts 
of the case and whether those facts indicate. that the defendant was 
negligent.9 In addition, jurors are generally asked to make the negligence 
decision with no more legal guidance than jury instructions similar to those 
previously quoted. 10 In most cases the instructions are only passively heard 
once and do no more than tell the jury to evaluate what the ordinary 
reasonable person would do given the circumstances. 11 The jury generally 
hears little more than the term "reasonable person," and rarely is the term 
actually defined. 12 Nor are they provided specific instructions to focus on 
the foreseeability of the harm, use the Hand Formula, or apply community 
morals or norms. 13 Instead they are largely left to their own devices to 
decide what is considered negligent behavior in this circumstance with only 
the vague, undefined concept of the reasonable person as their guide. 
In addition, the judge-who is arguably there to assist the jury-is of 
little to no help. In a jury trial, the judge's only role at this point is to 
provide the negligence standard to the jury through the jury instructions and 
to make sure the jury applies that standard reasonably. 14 In some states, the 
judge is even barred from answering clarification questions about the jury 
instructions posed by the jury during deliberations. 15 
Given that the Reasonable Person Standard16 is ill-defined and not easily 
understood by jurors, 17 the important question is: how are juries actually 
·interpreting and applying the standard? Additionally, are there systematic 
8. See, e.g., id. at 588. 
9. See, e.g., id. 
10· O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at§ 120.02. 
I 1. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 588. There is some broad empirical evidence 
that juror understanding of jury instructions, in general, is low. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 
1, at 78. 
12. See generally Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 1, at 82 (discussing Teaney v. City of St. Joseph, 548 
S.W. 2d 254, 255-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), as an example of when an appellate court held that it 
was an error for a trial court judge to provide feedback on a pattern jury instruction; even 
though the jury note showed clear confusion, the clarification consisted of pointing out two 
relevant instructions and highlighting certain sections of language, and both parties agreed that 
the clarification was accurate prior to showing it to the jury). 
1 fr Although the standard has been called a number of variations of this name, this is the 
phrase I will use throughout the article to maintain consistency. 
17. See William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 
CAL. L. REV. 731, 731 (1981); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 1, at 78-83 (discussing jury 
instructions in general, not specifically negligence jury instructions). 
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ways that human cognition might be unknowingly influencing the 
application of this standard? Although scholars and legal theorists have 
spent much time discussing how the Reasonable Person Standard should be 
understood, conceptualized, and modified, 18 little attention has been paid to 
how jurors actually interpret and apply the standard as presented by jury 
instruction. It is important to understand the Reasonable Person Standard as 
members of the jury actually interpret and understand it, since it is juries 
who apply the standard, not legal scholars. 19 I propose a need for a new 
conceptualization of the Reasonable Person Standard based on how the jury 
understands and interprets the standard. Moreover, the best way to 
understand the jury's perspective is through social science research focused 
on observing and evaluating the juror's decision-making tendencies. A new 
perspective on the Reasonable Person Standard rooted in actual jury thought 
processes and a better understanding of how the standard is actually applied 
will enhance legal scholarship and policy. 
This article will consist of four main parts. Part I will review the 
historical and current Reasonable Person Standard. More specifically, it will 
discuss a brief history of the common law negligence standard leading to 
the current commonly used Reasonable Person Standard, review the current 
American Law Institute ("ALI") language of the Reasonable Person 
Standard, and briefly outline the three most common legal theorist 
conceptualizations of the negligence standard in order to provide a review 
of the current understanding of the negligence standard. Part II will then 
examine the importance of the jury and the limited instruction they are 
provided in negligence cases. I will review commonly used jury instructions 
to provide the context in which jurors are interacting with the standard. Part 
III will argue that it is important to consider a new perspective of the 
Reasonable Person Standard based on how juries actually interpret and 
apply the standard. I will also argue that the best way to understand the jury 
is by reviewing existing research and conducting new, systematic empirical 
research on how juries interpret and apply the Reasonable Person Standard. 
I will then examine a few empirical findings, primarily from the discipline 
of social psychology, to demonstrate the influence that human cognition 
may have on jurors' interpretation of the Reasonable Person Standard. 
Finally, Part IV will conclude the article by emphasizing the importance of 
systematically studying jurors' perceptions of the Reasonable Person 
Standard. 
18. See infra Part III (noting that although some have tried to theorize how the Reasonable 
Person Standard is applied, few have used an empirical based approach to understanding jurors' 
thought processes). 
19. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 588. 
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I. THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD: ITS ORIGINS, CURRENT 
FORMULATION, AND ACADEMIC CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
Throughout its history, the Reasonable Person Standard has had multiple 
conceptualizations. Thus to understand the standard, it is important to first 
review its inception, history, and how it is currently conceptualized both by 
the courts and by scholars and legal theorists. This section of the paper will 
briefly examine the history and current understanding of the Reasonable 
Person Standard. 
A. Origins of the Negligence Standard 
Negligent causes of action constitute the majority of modem tort 
litigation.20 In negligent tort cases, there are four elements necessary to 
produce a cause of action: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. 21 
This paper focuses on the idea of negligence which is encompassed in the 
first two elements of a negligence cause of action: duty and breach of 
duty.22 The Reasonable Person Standard has a lengthy history as the legal 
doctrine for determining whether an ordinary individual's behavior has 
crossed the threshold into the domain of unacceptably risky behavior. 
Although the precise origin of the reasonable man23 as the negligence 
standard is often debated and largely unknown,24 many cite the 1837 case, 
Vaughan v. Menlove, 25 as the first case mentioning the reasonable man.26 
Since its inception, the Reasonable Person Standard has had an invasive 
presence throughout much of American jurisprudence including 
administrative law, constitutional law, contract law, criminal law, and-the 
context in which it is dealt with in this article-tort law.27 Although the 
Reasonable Person Standard is involved in many areas of the law, this paper 
will focus solely on the reasonable person as utilized in negligence-based 
20. Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person 
Standard, 54 V AND. L. REV. 863, 864 (2001) [hereinafter Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian]. 
21. E.g., Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1915). 
22. It is important to make the distinction between a negligent wrong, which involves 
breaching a duty, and the negligent act itself which is only one element of a negligent wrong. Id. 
23. Originally the modem Reasonable Person Standard was cast as the "Reasonable Man" 
but in its evolution was later made gender neutral. Other than in this section, I will always refer 
to the standard as the Reasonable Person Standard. 
24. Randy T. Austin, Better Off with the Reasonable Man Dead or The Reasonable Man 
Did the Darndest Things, 1992 BYUL. REV. 479,480 (1992). 
25. 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). 
26. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). 
27. Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the 
"Reasonable Man", 8 RUTGERS L.J. 311, 313 (1977). 
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liability in torts. It is in this area of tort law that the Reasonable Person 
Standard has had its greatest influence. 28 
B. The Reasonable Person Standard According to the ALI 
Negligence liability in tort law is generally an issue of common law, 
which has been crystallized and clarified in the Restatements. Both the first 
and second Restatement of Torts focused on conceptualizing negligence in 
terms of the reasonable person.29 The definition of negligence in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts reads, "[i]n the Restatement of this Subject, 
negligence is any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an 
interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."30 The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts used nearly identical language: "[i]n the Restatement of 
this Subject, negligence is conduct which falls below the standard 
established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm. It does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of 
others."31 Thus the Reasonable Person Standard was the prevailing standard 
of negligence liability of the ALI for nearly seventy years. 32 This further 
supports the conclusion that the Reasonable Person Standard has continued 
to be the prevailing, and most widely accepted, negligence standard through 
much of American legal history. The Restatement (First) of Torts set up the 
Reasonable Person Standard as the hallmark standard in negligence per se 
and ordinary negligence cases. 33 Both Restatements further defined the 
Reasonable Person as one who is expected to know and follow both 
statutory and common law determinations of what risks to avoid. 34 
In addition to stating the negligence standard in terms of the reasonable . 
person, the Restatements also contain additional discussion outlining more 
precisely what it means to behave reasonably. 35 It was the Restatement 
(First) of Torts that initially articulated a risk-utility type legal test even 
before Learned Hand first discussed the established Hand Formula. 36 
28. Id. 
29. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 282 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 
282 (1965). 
30. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 282 (1934) (emphasis added). 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 282 (1965). 
32. Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the 
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 V AND. L. REV. 813,822 (2001). 
33. Id. at 823. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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Similar to the Restatement (First) of Torts, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts eloquently states the balancing test: "the risk is unreasonable and the 
act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law 
regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is 
done. "37 This balancing test requires the Reasonable Person to balance the 
risk and utility of an action in an objective, impartial manner. 
[T]he actor should give to the respective interests concerned the 
value which the law attaches to them, but also that he should give 
an impartial consideration to the harm likely to be done the 
interests of the other as compared with the advantages likely to 
accrue to his own interests, free from the natural tendency of the 
actor, as a party concerned, to prefer his own interests than that of 
others.38 
The reasonable person, as it is often understood, is an abstract concept of 
appropriate behavior against which the defendant's behavior is measured to 
determine if that behavior entailed too much risk based on the purpose of 
that behavior and the circumstances involved. 
The ALI's Restatement (Third) of Torts-the current version of the 
Restatement-makes some changes to the language of the negligence 
standard but continues to focus on the Reasonable Person Standard in terms 
of a cost-benefit or risk-utility type analysis. 39 The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts describes: 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise 
reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to 
consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks 
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's 
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm 
that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or 
reduce the risk ofharm.40 
As in the previous Restatements, the language throughout the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts continues to include in both its text and the 
comments a focus on utilitarian-grounded definitions of negligent 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 291 (1965). 
38. Gilles, supra note 32, at 824 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. d 
(1965)). 
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM§ 3 
(2010). 
40. Id. 
710 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [ Ariz. St. L.J. 
behavior.41 Under the current ALI conception, the Reasonable Person 
Standard continues to require a thorough, impartial balancing of the utilities 
and risks of an individual's actions. 
C. Academic Interpretations of the Negligence Standard 
The Restatements are informative and worth reviewing as a 
crystallization of the current accepted standards of negligent liability as a 
common law standard, but the Reasonable Person Standard is also a hotly 
debated topic of legal theory. Legal scholarship has formulated many 
conceptualizations of what negligent liability should entail, largely focusing 
on the Reasonable Person Standard. 42 Each of these conceptualizations 
provides a unique perspective aimed at better understanding and defining 
the Reasonable Person Standard. Although there are many theories of 
negligence in the literature, this article will focus on three primary 
conceptualizations: (1) The Reasonable Person Standard as a test of 
foreseeability; (2) cost-benefit analyses like the Hand Formula; and (3) the 
Reasonable Person Standard as a basis for examining community norms. 
These conceptualizations, although valuable for elucidating what should be 
incorporated in an understanding of negligence, offer little insight on how 
the Reasonable Person Standard is actually understood in the courtroom. 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The hnportance of Foreseeability 
One of the first interpretations of the Reasonable Person Standard was 
presented by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 43 He suggested that when applying 
the Reasonable Person Standard, the jury should evaluate whether the 
outcome (i.e., injury) would have been foreseeable by others based on a 
combination of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances.44 From this 
perspective, the jury was instrumentai in determining if the outcome was 
foreseeable because they were in the best position to understand, from their 
own experiences, the danger of certain conduct under specific 
circumstances.45 Although this perspective values the jury as an important 
41. Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 20, at 865 ( criticizing the Discussion Draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles for focusing too heavily on a Hand Formula 
based cost-benefit analysis). 
42. See discussion infra Part I.C.1-3. 
43. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 591. 
44. Id. (citing OLNER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 87-88 (Mark De Wolfe 
Howe ed., Little, Brown 1963) (1881)). 
45. Id. 
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component in determining what is considered negligent behavior, once the 
jury has determined if the behavior was negligent it is seen as no longer 
useful.46 Once the jury reveals their determination of negligence based on 
the foreseeability of the harm from the specific conduct under the specific 
circumstances, then the judge should reduce the negligence standard to a 
specific rule tailored to the facts of the case.47 Based on this perspective, the 
jury provides little more than their combined opinion on whether an event 
was foreseeable given the facts. Once the jury examines foreseeability, a 
specific negligence standard is created and applied by the judge.48 Although 
useful theoretically, this perspective has not been readily adopted in most 
jurisdictions.49 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Hand Formula 
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,50 Judge Learned Hand first 
articulated what has become known as the Hand Formula. 51 Although this is 
often thought of as the creation of a new conceptualization of the 
Reasonable Person Standard, in actuality it was intended to make explicit 
the standard courts had long been applying.52 This perspective focused on 
the social function of negligent liability. 53 According to the formula, a judge 
or jury should measure and consider three things when determining 
negligent liability: (1) the size of the loss if an accident occurs, (2) the 
probability of that accident occurring, and (3) the costs of taking 
precautions that would prevent the accident from happening. 54 If the cost of 
taking precautions to prevent the accident is less than the magnitude of the 
accident multiplied by the probability of it occurring, then the defendant is 
considered negligent and should be held liable.55 The Hand Formula is 
focused on calculating the social and economic benefits of the defendant's 
actions and balancing those benefits against the burden of taking 
precautions to prevent the accident. 56 In some cases, the cost of taking 
46. Id 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides the common conceptualization of the 
Reasonable Person Standard as it is currently commonly used. See supra Part I.B. 
50. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
51. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Gilles, supra note 
32, at 815-18; Posner, supra note 6, at 32. 
52. Posner, supra note 6, at 32. 
53. Id. at 29. 
54. Id. at 32. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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precautions is minimal, such as putting a warning label on a product (i.e., 
"caution: drink is hot"), but in others, such as in a situation that might 
require installing additional costly safety equipment, the cost can be quite 
high. In cases where the safety costs are exceptionally high, the accident is 
unlikely to occur, and the harm would be minimal, the cost of preventing 
the accident may outweigh the discounted cost of an accident, and there is 
no negligence. 57 
This highly rational, economic perspective of negligence holds that when 
the net benefit in accident avoidance is higher than the cost of prevention, 
then the defendant should be held legally liable because society as a whole 
is better off if the accident is averted given the comparatively minimal costs 
of prevention. 58 By holding the defendant liable, it is anticipated that the 
defendant's own self-interest will lead him or her to take the necessary 
precautions to prevent the larger costs associated with being held liable. 59 It 
is important to note that although the Hand Formula suggests a quantitative-
based means of evaluating negligence, Judge Learned Hand himself 
recognized that at times it can be impossible to arrive at quantitative 
measures. 60 In addition, there are times when things are valued differently 
and based on differing norms.61 Although this perspective's extreme 
rationality is appealing, there are clearly issues that make it difficult to 
apply. Additionally, without clear quantitative measures, the perspective's 
rationality is hindered and there could be inconsistencies in outcomes. 
3. Applying Prevailing Community Norms 
Another conceptualization of the Reasonable Person Standard is that the 
jury is expected to apply the prevailing community norms when 
determining negligence.62 According to Steven Hetcher, people will base 
their jury decisions on their "ordinary moral understanding of the world," 
which the juror will intuit based on knowledge regarding community 
norms.63 He explains that "[j]urors, being ordinary members of the 
community untrained in utilitarian, Kantian, or other theoretical reasoning, 
have nothing else to appeal to but their social sense of how ordinary moral 
57. Id. at 37, 40. 
58. Id. at 33. 
59. Id. 
60. Gilles, supra note 32, at 818. 
61. Id. at 821. 
62. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 591-92. 
63. Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 20, at 878. 
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members of the community would have acted in parallel circumstances."64 
Community norms supply a generally understood basis for knowing what 
are and are not acceptable actions. In other words, community norms can 
help cue a jury to what actions are inappropriate, i.e., negligent. 
These norms can be thought of in two different ways: (1) as an 
application of the community moral standards; or (2) as an application of 
whether the defendant breached a community endorsed safety standard 
intended to prevent harm.65 Focusing first on community moral norms, the 
perspective posits that while jurors deliberate, they intuitively rely on 
"ordinary moral intuitions" regarding what is considered reasonable 
behavior. 66 The prevalent community moral norms have a strong influence 
on the individual's moral intuition, thus supplying them with a moral basis 
for determining negligence. 67 The second conceptualization incorporating 
norms deals not with moral norms but with normative practices. 68 The jury 
is essentially a cross-section of the community intended to best typify what 
the normative actions are, including normative safety precautions. 69 
In many cases the community moral norms and safety norms are aligned. 
For example, it is arguably both a community moral norm and a safety 
norm to stop when you encounter a red light while driving. Most people 
(i.e., the community) consider stopping at a red light the morally correct 
thing to do. Likewise, it is understood by practically everyone that stopping 
at a red light is an important safety precaution to prevent being hit by 
oncoming traffic. In this example the norms align, but that isn't always so. 
Take for example driving while drowsy from lack of sleep. The community 
moral norm would likely tell us not to drive while in this impaired condition 
because most are aware that extreme, negative consequences-such as 
killing someone by causing a head-on collision-could occur. Yet the 
prevalent action is to drive when drowsy despite the fact that it may be safer 
not to drive. 70 Thus, in this example, the community moral norm and the 
safety norm are in opposition. 
64. Id. at 880. 
65. Id. 
66. Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence 
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633,640 (2003) [hereinafter Hetcher, The Jury's Out]. 
67. Id. 
68. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 592. 
69. Id. 
70. The fact that the safety standard of not driving when drowsy is not followed is evident 
from the statistic that 60% of drivers, the majority, report having driven drowsy in the last year. 
Facts and Stats, DROWSYDRIVING.ORG, NATIONAL SLEEP FOUNDATION, 
http://drowsydriving.org/about/facts-and-stats. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JURIES AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN APPLYING 
THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD 
Throughout its history and in each of the three major perspectives 
discussed in Part I, the jury has played an integral role in the application of 
the Reasonable Person Standard. 71 This next section will discuss the 
importance of the jury's role as the Reasonable Person Standard decision-
maker. It will also discuss the information about the standard that is 
presented to the jury-the jury instructions-to better understand the formal 
means through which the standard is conveyed to the jury. 
A. The Importance of the Jury 
The jury is an integral part of the American civil justice system and has 
been referred to as "one of the cornerstones of American liberty."72 In a 
torts case, either litigant may request a jury, and-when requested-it is the 
jury that makes the determination of whether the defendant's actions were 
negligent. 73 Thus, the jury is an integral part of the trial. Additionally, the 
jury even has influence outside of the courtroom. The majority of cases 
which settle before setting foot in a courtroom are influenced by juries in 
that settlements are based largely on the legal practitioners' perceptions of 
how a jury would analyze and decide the case. 74 Legal practitioners 
understand the important role that the jury plays and will use their 
understanding of the jury-possibly based on personal experience, intuition, 
and/or complex and expensive jury studies 75-in the bargaining process. 
Intuition and understanding of how the jury functions, thinks, and decides is 
instrumental in determining who has the upper hand in the bargaining and 
eventual settlement process. As so eloquently stated, "litigants bargain in 
the shadow of the jury."76 Consequently, both negligence cases that go to 
trial and those that settle outside of court are decided primarily on the basis 
of how the jury is interpreting and applying relevant legal standards. 77 
71. See generally Gilles, supra note 32, at 823. 
72. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48 
DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 203 (1998). 
73. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 633. 
74. Friedman, supra note 72, at 204. 
75. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 633. 
76. Id. 
77. It is only in rare cases that the jury's decision is so incongruent with the law that their 
decision is nullified. See Jones v. U.P.S., 674 F.3d 1187, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
jury's $2 million punitive damages award was excessive and violated the employer's federal 
due process rights). 
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In negligence cases, the jury is in a unique situation where they are 
ruling with regard to more than just the facts of the case. 78 Not only is the 
jury responsible for deciding the facts of the case, they must also make an 
evaluation about the appropriateness of the defendant's actions, often using 
some form of the Reasonable Person Standard. 79 Juries are essentially 
creating their own unique rules regarding whether the defendant should be 
liable for his or her actions, given the specific facts of the case. 
Interestingly, the jury listens to the case, is provided the legal standard for 
negligence, deliberates, and makes its decision without having to provide 
any justification or reasoning for its conclusion. 80 After the verdict, the jury 
is simply disbanded, 81 and new juries are created for subsequent trials. 82 
Thus, for each unique case there is a unique jury evaluating the defendant's 
liability. 
B. Influence of Jury Instructions 
Jury instructions (and the accompanying liability standard) provided by 
the judge are the only means through which the relevant legal standard is 
described and explained to the jury. 83 They are intended both to guide the 
jury and constrain them in their deliberation and verdict. 84 When given the 
jury instructions, jurors are asked to listen passively and are only rarely 
given a written copy or allowed to ask clarification questions. 85 
Understanding how jury instructions are presented to the jury is an integral 
component to appreciating precisely how the jury applies the Reasonable 
Person Standard.86 For example, if the jury instructions mirror the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts language,87 then the jury is provided with 
78. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 590. 
79. Id. 
80. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 642. 
81. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 590. 
82. Interestingly, given the fleeting nature of the jury and the vagueness of the legal 
standard in negligence cases, it is possible, and at times likely, that different juries would reach 
different verdicts. Id. These outcome differences make it extremely difficult for lawyers and 
their clients to accurately "bargain in the shadow of the jury" since the jury's shadow is a 
moving target. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 633. This means that settlements are 
bargained not in accordance with the actual standard, but are instead based on the individual's 
limited interpretation of what they think juries tend to do. 
83. See Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 639. 
84. Id. 
85. Edith Greene & Michael Johns, Jurors' Use of Instructions on Negligence, 31 J. 
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 840, 842 (2001). 
86. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 588. 
87. "A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the 
circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks 
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explicit language directing them to apply a standard akin to the Hand 
Formula.88 The jury would be explicitly directed to consider three factors: 
(1) the foreseeability of the harm; (2) the foreseeability of the severity of the 
harm; and (3) the costs of eliminating or reducing the risk of harm. 89 If the 
jury is provided with this type of explicit direction on how to apply the 
Reasonable Person Standard, then it is logical that its verdict will reflect 
careful reasoning and balancing of each factor of the formula. In contrast, if 
the jury is asked to apply the Reasonable Person Standard and told nothing 
more than "[i]t is a failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably 
prudent person would have used under the same circumstances"90 then it is 
difficult to know how exactly the jury is determining negligence. Are they 
examining the foreseeability of the harm? Are they focused on a cost-
benefit analysis? Is there any consideration of norms? In this situation, there 
is simply no way of knowing how the jury interpreted the Reasonable 
Person Standard. 
Examining pattern jury instructions is the best way to know how the 
Reasonable Person Standard is being presented to the jury. Pattern jury 
instructions were first adopted in 1938.91 As of 2001-when the most 
systematic study of pattern jury instructions for negligence was 
completed-forty-eight of the fifty states, and Washington, D.C., had 
pattern or recommended jury instructions.92 The purpose of setting pattern 
jury instructions is to maintain technical accuracy in how the law is 
conveyed with the intent to reduce the number of cases going to appellate 
review because of flawed jury instructions. 93 Essentially, jury instructions 
provide a means of simplifying one of the complexities of the litigation 
process and ensuring fairness through uniformity. Although using pattern 
jury instructions that maintain technical accuracy is arguably very useful, it 
often results in instructions that are full of legal jargon and difficult to 
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the 
foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or 
reduce the risk of harm." RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010). 
88. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
89. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM§ 3 
(2010). 
90. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 595 (quoting N.Y. P.J.I. Crv. 2:10 (3d ed. 2000)). 
91. Id. at 593. The first jurisdictions to adopt pattern jury instructions included California, 
Washington, D.C., Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, Colorado, and Utah. Id. 
92. Id. at 594. 
93. Greene & Johns, supra note 85, at 841. 
45:0703] THE REAL REASONABLE PERSON 717 
understand.94 This makes the jury's task more difficult and inhibits its 
ability to accurately apply the standard.95 
In 2001, Kelley and Wendt reviewed the pattern jury instructions 
available for each state and focused on analyzing the language describing 
the negligence standard.96 Based on their review, they concluded that most 
negligence pattern jury instructions define negligence using a combination 
of language regarding ordinary care and language concerning the conduct of 
a reasonable, careful person. 97 The language was such that it either 
described an affirmative duty or the failure to use ordinary care. 98 For 
example, an affirmative duty is expressed by the Illinois instruction: "[i]t 
was the duty of the defendant, before and at the time of the occurrence, to 
use ordinary care for the safety of [the plaintiff and the plaintiffs property]. 
That means it was the duty of the defendant to be free from negligence."99 
Failure to use ordinary care instructions typically read like the New York 
pattern jury instructions: "[ n ]egligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure 
to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used 
under the same circumstances . . . ."100 Like the provided New York 
example, most state pattern jury instructions tend to define ordinary care 
based on the conduct of the reasonably prudent person or similar 
language. 101 
As the findings by Kelley and Wendt show, jury instructions vary 
slightly, but the instruction regarding negligence is modally given as the 
Reasonable Person Standard without mention of a risk-utility or cost-
benefit styled balancing test for determining what actions are considered 
reasonable. 102 Nor do the instructions mention tests related to the 
foreseeability of harm or application of community norms. To inspect a 
current example more closely, the Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 
defines negligence as: 
when the person fails to exercise ordinary care. "Ordinary ca[r]e" 
is the care a reasonable person would use in similar circumstances. 
A person is negligent if the person, without intending to do harm, 
94. Id.; Schwarzer, supra note 17, at 731; Steele & Thornburg, supra note I, at 79-83. 
95. Greene & Johns, supra note 85, at 841. 
96. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 595 (examining all available pattern jury instructions 
for the jurisdictions that had them). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (quoting ILL. P.J.I. CN. 10.04 (2000)). 
100. Id. (quoting N.Y. P.J.I. CN. 2:10 (3d ed. 2000)). 
101. Id. at 596 (Similar language includes: "the reasonably careful person; the reasonably 
careful and prudent person; the ordinary, prudent person; or the ordinary, careful person."). 
102. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 639. 
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does something ( or fails to do something) a reasonable person 
would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or 
damage to a person or property. 103 
The Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions also conceptualize 
negligence purely in terms of the Reasonable Person: 
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is 
that degree of care that a reasonably careful person would use 
under like circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing 
something that a reasonably careful person would not do under 
like circumstances, or in failing to do something that a reasonably 
careful person would do under like circumstances. '04 
As is evident from the provided pattern jury instruction examples, juries 
are typically told to apply the Reasonable Person Standard without any 
further explicit instruction clarifying the standard. Juries are not typically 
given instructions directing them to use a cost-benefit or risk-utility test, 
examine the foreseeability of harm, or apply community norms to the facts 
of the case. 105 Rather, they are left with only vague instructions using 
phrases like "unreasonable risk,"106 "reasonable care,"107 or "ordinary 
care."108 These phrases do not naturally bring to mind the conceptualizations 
of the Reasonable Person Standard suggested by the ALI in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts or various scholars and legal theorists. 109 Thus, it may be 
unreasonable to think that a jury, of its own volition and without additional 
instruction from the judge, would apply a complex cost-benefit or risk-
utility test1 10 or other standard. This is especially true given that most jurors 
have no previous experience applying the negligence test. 111 
There is even empirical evidence that the Reasonable Person Standard as 
commonly formulated is confusing to jurors. 112 In general, studies show that 
jurors misunderstand the laws and instructions and this misunderstanding is 
often attributed to the confusing nature of legal language which is full of 
103. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at§ 120.02. 
104. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES), STATE CLAIMS 
INSTRUCTION No. 1.1 (2005) (internal emphasis omitted). 
105. Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 20, at 876. 
106. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at§ 120.02. 
107. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES), STATE CLAIMS 
INSTRUCTION No. 1.2 (2005). 
108. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at§ 155.30. 
109. Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 20, at 876; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010). 
110. Id. 
111. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 650-51. 
112. Greene & Johns, supra note 85. 
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jargon or is overly vague. 113 One study found that only about a third of the 
mock jurors recognized the definition or knew the legal standard for 
negligence when answering questions about the given jury instruction both 
before and after deliberation even though they had been provided the 
instructions just shortly prior. 114 Interestingly, this was even the case when 
the mock jurors were given a written copy of the instructions suggesting 
that it is an issue of not understanding the instructions rather than a failure 
to remember them. 115 This finding is especially grim when you consider the 
relative simplicity of the types of cases and instructions used in this 
research study compared to the complexity that can arise in actual cases. 116 
Ill. UNDERSTANDING THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD FROM THE 
JUROR'S PERSPECTNE 
As discussed, the Reasonable Person Standard has a long history with 
many unique conceptualizations. For example, the ALI and legal scholars 
have thought about the Reasonable Person Standard in terms of the 
foreseeability of the harm, a balancing of the cost and benefits of the 
situation, the prevailing community standards, or some combination of the 
three. 117 Each of these perspectives provides useful insight towards an 
understanding of the Reasonable Person Standard and how it could-or 
arguably should-be applied. However, given the central role of the jury in 
applying the Reasonable Person Standard and the formulation of most jury 
instructions, which lack specific directions to apply any of these 
conceptualizations of the standard, there is something missing from legal 
scholarship's understanding of the standard. What is missing is a picture of 
how jurors and juries actually understand and apply the standard as written. 
Although it is possible to theorize how juries understand and apply the 
Reasonable Person Standard based on what seems reasonable or anecdotal 
evidence, the best way to discover what is actually happening in the 
deliberation room is through an examination of the social sciences that 
study judgment and decision-making, such as social psychology. The 
findings from these fields provide valuable insight into how people 
understand and reason through complicated information and their decision-
making processes. Within these fields, there are even empirical studies 
specifically evaluating juror decision-making. These types of studies may 
113. Id. at 841--42. 
114. Id. at 853. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 854. 
117. See supra Part I. 
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look a lot like the study discussed supra regarding the confusion mock 
jurors experienced when presented with jury instructions regarding the 
Reasonable Person Standard. 118 By systematically analyzing juror and jury 
responses using experimental methodology, it would be possible to gather a 
more nuanced and complete understanding of how the standard is actually 
understood and applied. By better understanding jurors and their decision-
making process, scholars, legal theorists, judges, and lawyers can have a 
better understanding of why juries give the verdicts they do. 
Although there are many different areas of social psychology that could 
be applied to enhance the understanding of juror decision-making, 119 the 
next section of the paper will outline some of the findings from social 
psychology focused on judgment and decision-making and discuss their 
implications for juror application of the Reasonable Person Standard. I 
chose to focus on the judgment and decision-making literature in order to 
identify various ways that natural human cognition may influence-or 
possibly even hinder-a juror's ability to apply the various analyses 
endorsed by the ALI and legal scholars. This discussion is only intended to 
provide a brief explanation of a few findings and highlights a need for 
further research in order to fully understand the Reasonable Person 
Standard as applied and understood by the jury. 
A. Limitations on Systematic Evaluation: The Theory of Bounded 
Rationality 
Science has a long history of trying to understand the way that humans 
access and process information. Many initial theories focused on the 
potential for perfect rationality based largely on mathematical models of 
decision-making that optimized economic outcomes for the individual. 120 
Although some of the original theories of judgment and decision-making, 
such as theories based on the concept of Homo Economicus, viewed people 
as perfectly rational decision-makers that make careful, deliberate decisions 
focused on optimizing a predetermined goal, research has frequently shown 
that people's decisions often appear irrational according to this definition of 
rationality. 121 Perfect rationality requires mental processing abilities and 
levels of knowledge and information that are often beyond our cognitive 
118. Greene & Johns, supra note 85. 
119. For example, the areas of social psychology related to group dynamics and the 
influence of social norms might be very relevant but outside the scope of this article. 
120. Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, Bounding Rationality to the World, 24 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 143, 144 (2003) [hereinafter Todd & Gigerenzer, Bounding Rationality]. 
121. Id. 
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abilities in our day-to-day decision-making. The perfectly rational decision-
maker's cognitive machinery must be "so powerful as to be able to follow 
any script set by the environment, with nary a forgotten line or missed 
cue."122 
In many situations this type of rational decision-making is not possible. 
For example, based on Homo Economicus styled economic decision-
making, whenever making a monetary decision an individual should 
perform a complex cost-benefit analysis which requires obtaining all 
relevant knowledge and exerting extreme levels of mental effort that is 
often impractical to maintain with every decision an individual makes 
throughout the day. 123 Could you imagine having to perform a painstaking 
cost-benefit analysis every time you decide where to shop for the items on 
your grocery list? Often this type of decision-making is highly impractical. 
The psychological theory of Bounded Rationality contrasts theories of 
perfect rationality; it considers the influence of limiting factors such as 
time, knowledge, and attention on individuals' decision-making abilities. 
The theory of Bounded Rationality is the overarching theory that explains 
why people under some circumstances have seemingly systematically 
flawed decision-making. 124 The theory of Bounded Rationality, originally 
developed by Herbert Simon, 125 holds that there are two unique yet 
intimately related sets of bounds that limit people's ability to make perfectly 
rational decisions: (1) ecological limitations consisting of external bounds 
that are limitations set by the environment and (2) cognitive limitations 
consisting of internal bounds that are cognitive limitations on the processing 
and holding of information. 126 Ecological limitations consist of issues such 
as a lack of information or the high costs of searching for information. 127 
Cognitive limitations include, but are not limited to, limitations on the speed 
of processing or the amount of information an individual can maintain in his 
or her working memory. 128 You can think of this using a computer as a 
model. The computer can only function as well as it was designed and it can 
only make a decision based on the inputted information. If the computer is 
122. Id. 
123. Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 
221,223 (1995) (quoting John Stuart Mill, Homo Economicus "is concerned with him solely as 
a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy 
of means for obtaining that end"). 
124. See id. 
125. Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models 
of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650,651 (1996). 
126. Todd & Gigerenzer, Bounded Rationality, supra note 120, at 144. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
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limited in the complexity of its programming and is only given a limited 
amount of input, then its processing may result in an inappropriate outcome. 
According to the theory of Bounded Rationality, these limitations result in 
the use of an information-processing system that seeks to "satisfice."129 
Satisficing is a term created from combining the words sufficing and 
satisfying. 130 The goal in satisficing is to make decisions with the most 
successful outcomes given the limitations on time, knowledge, and 
processing. 131 Satisficing occurs when one sets limited criteria for a 
decision, and when you come across the first alternative matching those 
criteria, you choose that alternative without continuing to take the time to 
survey all the possible alternatives. 132 
It is important to note that Bounded Rationality is not the same thing as 
irrationality. 133 People are still adhering to a set of decision-making rules 
and their decisions are still motivated by a focused goal. 134 The decision-
making rules have simply shifted from a complex, thorough decision-
making process that requires perfect knowledge, high cognitive function, 
and an adequate amount of time, to one that makes the best possible 
decision while limiting each of those things. Bounded Rationality 
essentially results in a tradeoff between resources, be they ecological or 
cognitive, and improvements in judgment. 135 Much of the time, Bounded 
Rationality results in decisions that are nearly as optimal as those made in a 
perfectly rational decision-making system but at a fraction of the cost. 136 
Bounded Rationality has important implications for juror decision-
making processes and their understanding and application of the Reasonable 
Person Standard. First, jury members are asked to do an exceptionally 
difficult task and have only a limited amount of cognitive ability to devote 
to their decision-making processes. These abilities are further limited by the 
complexity and depth of information provided in a jury trial and the typical 
juror's lack of legal expertise. In addition, as previously discussed, research 
shows that jurors have difficulty understanding negligence jury 
instructions. 137 These factors are of the nature that would limit a juror's 
ability to show the perfectly rational decision-making displayed by Homo 
Economicus. Instead, it is likely that juror decision-making is bounded 
129. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supra note 125, at 651. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Todd & Gigerenzer, Bounding Rationality, supra note 120, at 146-47. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Green & Johns, supra note 85, at 853. 
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much like most areas of decision-making. As a consequence, it would be 
exceptionally difficult for jurors to strictly adhere to the type of rational 
analyses proposed by the ALI and legal theorists. For example, it is 
exceptionally difficult for a juror to apply a complicated cost-benefit 
analysis that accurately considered all the relevant components in a case. 138 
Instead-at best-even if attempting to apply a cost-benefit analysis like 
the Hand Formula, jurors are likely only approximating some simplified 
version of the analysis which is potentially influenced by systematic 
cognitive biases. 
B. Dual Systems of Processing: Central Route vs. Peripheral Route 
Processing 
Related to the theory of Bounded Rationality, most social psychologists 
accept that there are generally two routes to processing information: the 
central route139 and the peripheral route. 140 The central route involves the 
individual taking on an extensive cognitive load-exerting a great deal of 
mental effort-in order to thoughtfully scrutinize relevant information and 
reach a conclusion. 141 This type of mental processing is associated with 
complex computations and high levels of concentration. 142 In contrast, with 
peripheral route processing, the recipient uses far less cognitive effort, and 
instead of thoughtfully processing issue-relevant information, he or she 
relies on associations and other non-content cues in deciding to accept a 
message's conclusion. 143 Although commonly discussed in terms of its 
extremes, processing can fall anywhere on a continuum from the central end 
to the peripheral end, depending on the recipient's motivation and ability to 
process the available information. 144 When motivation and ability are 
present, central route processing is more likely to occur. 145 In contrast, if 
motivation is lacking or if ability is limited then processing towards the 
138. Posner, supra note 6, at 32. 
139. Also known as systematic processing or System 2. See Daniel Kahneman, THINKING 
FAST AND SLOW 20 (2011 ). 
140. Also known as heuristic processing or System 1. See id. 
141. Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of 
Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 752, 753 
(1980); Derek D. Rucker & Richard E. Petty, Increasing the Effectiveness of Communication to 
Consumers: Recommendations Based on Elaboration Likelihood and Attitude Certainty 
Perspectives, 25 J. PUB. PoL'Y & MARKETING 39, 39-40 (2006). 
142. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 21 (2011). 
143. Chaiken, supra note 141; Rucker & Petty, supra note 141. 
144. Rucker & Petty, supra note 141. 
145. Id. 
724 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
peripheral route end of the continuum is more likely to occur. 146 Processing 
is also more on the peripheral route end of the continuum when there is only 
limited information available. 147 If there is no information to process then an 
individual is forced to rely on peripheral route processing. 
Peripheral route processing has been a much studied area of social 
psychology because of its implications for judgment and decision-making. 
Peripheral route processing is beneficial because it is quick, automatic, and 
requires little to no conscious control. 148 Also, peripheral route processing 
feeds into central route processing. 149 It creates the initial impressions and 
gut feelings that later drive central route processing. 150 Daniel Kahneman, a 
prominent researcher in the field, describes peripheral route processing as 
"effortlessly originating impressions and feelings that are the main source 
of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of [ central route processing] ... 
. [Peripheral route processing] continuously generates suggestions for 
[ central route processing]: impressions, intuitions, intentions, and 
feelings." 151 He continues by saying, "When all goes smoothly, which is 
most of the time, [ central route processing] adopts the suggestions of 
[peripheral route processing] with little or no modification."152 Thus, even 
when systematic, in-depth processing occurs it is influenced by the initial 
gut reactions an individual experiences when presented with a problem. The 
implication of this is that jurors' understanding and application of the 
Reasonable Person Standard will often be tainted by their initial 
impressions of the cases and interpretation of the rules even if they are 
about to reach the point of deliberate, thoughtful scrutiny of the case. 
C. Understanding Initial, Gut Reactions: The Importance of Heuristics 
Peripheral route processing is largely influenced by heuristics. 
Heuristics, or mental short-cuts based on simple hard-and-fast rules, allow 
the recipient to use generalized knowledge from past experiences, 
observations, and intuitions to form attitudes rather than relying on a 
content based analysis of the issue. 153 The following sections will review a 
few key heuristics and decision short cuts that could play an important role 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 21 (2011). 
149. Id. at 24. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Gerd Bohner, Markus Ruder & Hans-Peter Erb, When Expertise Baclifires: Contrast 
and Assimilation Effects in Persuasion, 41 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCH. 495,495 (2002). 
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in understanding the Reasonable Person based on a psychological model of 
human judgment and decision-making. 
1. Framing Effects 
Most legal scholars and practitioners understand the importance of 
choosing your words carefully. Countless hours are put into carefully 
drafting legislation, pattern jury instructions, etc., and for good reason. 
Social and cognitive psychological research has demonstrated the 
importance that the framing of a statement can have on a decision-maker's 
choice. 154 Possibly the best way to summarize the research is the following: 
by altering the framing of the decision-maker's options or purpose, it is 
possible to affect the perspective from which they view the issue. 155 
Variations in perspective influence how the individual thinks about the 
issue which can ultimately impact their decision. 156 For example, a great 
deal of the research on framing has focused on whether a statement is 
framed as a gain or as a loss. 157 The research scenarios often outline 
situations where a percentage of lives can be saved or a percentage of lives 
will be lost. 158 Even though the statements are constrained to be 
mathematically identical, the results of these studies show that people who 
receive the framing in terms of a gain are risk adverse, meaning they prefer 
the certainty of receiving a smaller gain to a smaller probability of receiving 
a proportionally larger gain. 159 In contrast, those who receive a statement 
framed as a loss are more risk taking, meaning that they prefer a probability 
of receiving a proportionally larger loss to the certainty of getting a smaller 
loss. 160 
The framing literature has important implications for how negligence 
should be conceptualized and described to the jury. In Kelley and Wendt's 
review of the pattern jury instructions, there were two distinctive trends in 
the way the instructions were framed. 161 Negligence was either framed by 
the pattern jury instructions in terms of a positive duty to exercise ordinary 
care or as a failure to exercise ordinary, reasonable care. 162 Although the 
154. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Kelley & Wendt, suprg note 4, at 595. 
162. Id. 
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essence of these instructions is the same and the key wording is largely 
identical, the variation in framing could have important implications for 
how the jury views the case. These implications could mean that under one 
frame the jury is more risk adverse and less willing to view the defendant as 
negligent than if they were given the opposite framing. Further research 
examining this specific issue would need to be done to determine the actual 
effect that framing would have on jurors' cognitive understanding and 
evaluation of the case. 
2. The Outcome Bias 163 
The outcome bias and hindsight bias are two highly related 
psychological mechanisms that have been shown to affect evaluations of 
responsibility. 164 In fact, studies have shown that these cognitive 
mechanisms can result in mock jurors basing their decisions regarding 
negligence on factors that legal scholars view as irrelevant and should not 
be considered. 165 The outcome bias is the tendency of people to attribute 
more responsibility to an individual when the outcome of an event resulting 
from that individual's actions causes more harm compared to a situation 
where the action is the same but the harm is less severe. 166 This bias was 
first studied in 1966, when Elaine Waister completed her seminal study 
showing that people attribute more responsibility to an individual when the 
outcome of an accident is more severe, and they perceive that increased 
safety precautions should be taken compared to when there is minimal 
damage. 167 Since the first study, others have found similar results. 168 A 
163. Also referred to as 'defensive attribution.' Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity 
and Judgments of "Resposibility": A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2575, 
2576 (2000) (explaining defensive attribution as the idea that people tend to attribute more 
responsibility to an individual as the severity of the consequences of an outcome of an event 
increase). 
164. See, e.g., id; Alison C. Smith & Edith Greene, Conduct and Its Consequences: 
Attempts and Debiasing Jury Judgments, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHA V. 505, 505 (2005). 
165. Edith Greene, Michael Johns & Jason Bowman, The Effects of Injury Severity on Jury 
Negligence Decisions, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 675,675 (1999). 
166. E.g. Robbennolt, supra note 163. 
167. Elaine Waister, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 73, 77 (1966) (In her study, the accident involved a situation where an 
individual parked a car and then it rolled down a hill. In the less severe situation the damage 
was inconsequential and consisted of a small dent in the bumper of the car. In the more severe 
situation the damage consisted of the car rolling down a hill, crashing into a store window and 
hitting a child who was just dazed, and also hitting and hospitalizing a grocer for a year.). 
168. Robbennolt, supra note 163, at 2577 (based on this meta-analysis, although there are 
some studies which report no effect, there are enough studies showing a relationship to conclude 
that the effect does exist but may be, in part, context dependent). 
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subset of these studies focused specifically on situations in which people are 
asked to make responsibility judgments about situations involving civil 
liability. 169 Overall, these studies found an effect' 70 of the severity of 
damage on assessments of civil liability. 171 This was even the case in a study 
where the level of carelessness-reasonable versus careless-was 
manipulated. 172 In this study, even when the level of care was taken into 
account and the mock jury was allowed to deliberate, the perception of 
negligence was influenced by the amount of damages caused by the 
defendant's actions. 173 The researchers concluded that the study supports the 
conclusion that jurors are influenced by the severity of the damages in 
assessing negligence based on the irrelevant desire to see the plaintiff 
compensated for his or her injuries. 174 Overall, this research shows that 
people naturally, and without thinking about it, take into consideration the 
size of the damage when assessing whether someone is responsible, i.e., 
negligent, for that outcome. 
3. The Hindsight Bias 
Strongly related to the outcome bias and having similar effects on 
evaluations of negligence is the hindsight bias. Like the outcome bias, the 
hindsight bias is related to knowledge of a situation. The hindsight bias is 
colloquially thought of as the · "I-knew-it-all-along" effect. 175 It is the 
tendency for an individual to see an event as more foreseeable, i.e., guess a 
higher probability that the event would have happened, once they know it 
has happened. 176 For example, if you were to ask an individual on Sunday, 
what are the chances that it is going to rain on Monday, they might say 
30%. But if you asked him or her on Tuesday, after it had already rained on 
Monday, how he or she would have estimated on Sunday the probability of 
it raining on Monday, then they would have estimated the chance of rain on 
Monday as higher. By knowing on Tuesday that it rained on Monday, 
people perceive their past evaluations of the likelihood of rain to be more 
169. Id. at 2595-96. 
170. Effect sizes are a way of measuring the degree to which the variables are related. 
171. Robbennolt, supra note 163, at 2595-96. 
172. Greene, Johns & Bowman, supra note 165, at 682-84. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (based on a meditational analysis with negligence rating mediated by the 
participants rating of desire to compensate the plaintiff for his economic losses). 
175. Rebecca L. Guibault, Fred B. Bryant, Jennifer Howard Brockway & Emil J. Posavac, 
A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias, 26 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 103, 103 
(2004). 
176. Id. 
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accurate than if they were to make the same evaluation about a future event. 
A meta-analysis has shown that studies on the hindsight bias routinely 
maintain moderate effect sizes. 177 The hindsight bias is a powerful bias that 
is extremely pervasive throughout human cognition. 178 Once people know 
the outcome of an event, it is extremely difficult to not consider the 
outcome when assessing the likelihood that the event will occur. Thus, post-
hoc judgments of an action are influenced by the outcome.179 
In cases involving negligence, it is impossible for the juror to not know 
the outcome. From the juror's perspective, they already know that the 
defendant's actions likely caused some injury to the plaintiff. 180 Yet despite 
this fact, because of the nature of negligence law and the structure of our 
legal system, the jury is asked to dismiss what they know in hindsight and 
instead decide the issue of negligence using a foresight perspective. 181 But 
are there ways to prevent juries from falling victim to the hindsight bias? 
Smith and Greene examined the influence of two different methods 
attempting to prevent the influence of the hindsight bias: (1) methods 
related to admonishing the jury about the effects of hindsight and (2) 
bifurcating trial evidence. 182 Admonishing the jury about the effects of the 
hindsight bias can take multiple forms: the judge explaining the hindsight 
bias to the jury, the judge instructing the jury to disregard specific pieces of 
information, and an acknowledgement to the jury that there are tendencies 
to reason one way and provide a rationale for why they should actually 
reason another way. 183 In general, research has shown that asking the jury to 
disregard specific pieces of evidence or testimony is entirely ineffective. 184 
But there is some slight evidence that warning the jury about the hindsight 
bias and encouraging them to use other methods for making their decision 
can reduce the effects of the hindsight bias. 185 
Another method of attempting to ameliorate the effects of the hindsight 
bias is bifurcation of the trial. This is when the liability and damages 
components of the trial are separated. 186 This can be done by either having 
the same jury decide the two parts of the case separately, thus information 
177. Id. 
178. Id.at 109. 
179. Smith & Greene, supra note 164, at 506. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 508 (both of these methods are currently utilized by some courts under some 
situations). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. (It can at times actually draw more attention to that piece of evidence). 
185. Id. at 508, 524 (although bifurcation seems to be more effective). 
186. Id. at 509. 
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about each section is only presented when the appropriate decision is being 
made. Or, each section of the trial is decided by its own independent jury. 187 
Keeping the details of the extent of the injury to the plaintiff out of the trial 
when liability is being assessed does lessen the effect of the hindsight 
bias. 188 But, as long as the jury is assessing liability in the context of 
knowing that some injury occurred, they will likely be at least moderately 
influenced by knowledge that an injury exists creating a bias against the 
defendant unless future research can illuminate a new method of reducing 
the hindsight bias. 189 
4. Counterfactual Thinking-A Helping Heuristic 
Although heuristics are discussed in relation to how they hinder "proper" 
decision-making, there are situations when evoking a heuristic may actually 
improve an individual's decision-making process. By using the heuristic of 
counterfactual thinking, it may be possible to induce jurors to think about 
the normality of the defendant's behavior and the standard of care that 
should be used. 190 "Counterfactual" literally means "contrary to the facts." 191 
Counterfactual thinking is the contemplation of "what could have been." 192 
It is a method of thinking about alternative versions of the past. 193 
Counterfactual thinking is all about making direct comparisons between 
what actually happened and what could have happened had the 
circumstances been different. 194 For example, if a student fails an exam, he 
or she will likely have thoughts like, "if only I had studied more, I would 
have done better." In this example the student thinks about what he or she 
could have done differently in the past to affect the present circumstance. 
He or she could also consider the effects getting more sleep, attending class, 
and attending a review session might have had on the outcome of the exam. 
Research was done asking mock jurors to think counterfactually about a 
scenario by writing out circumstances that would change the outcome of the 
"accident."195 Those who listed safety precautions that the defendant could 
have taken found the defendant's conduct to fall further below their self-
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 522-23. 
189. Id. 
190. Richard L. Wiener et al., Counter/actual Thinking in Mock Juror Assessments of 
Negligence: A Preliminary Investigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89, 89 (1994). 
191. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 133,133 (1997). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 133-34. 
195. Wiener et al., supra note 190, at 93-94. 
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defined standard of care. 196 In addition, there is some evidence that 
counterfactual thinking is often focused on norms and that counterfactual 
thinking encourages an individual to return to the normal state of affairs. 197 
If an individual has had a negative outcome because of deviation from the 
norm (failing an exam when the student did not study) then it is likely that 
counterfactual thinking will result in the individual deciding that they need 
to return to the norm (studying for the exam). Overall, counterfactual 
thinking induces individuals to analyze the situation at a deeper, more 
thorough level. Jurors who engage in counterfactual thinking will evaluate 
the defendant's actions differently than those who do not. By encouraging 
counterfactual thinking, the court can influence the jury to think about 
untaken safety precautions. In addition, there is evidence that these other 
generated options for behavior will likely be based on common norms, 198 as 
advocated in the discussion of traditional conceptualizations of the 
Reasonable Person Standard previously discussed. 199 The issue with 
counterfactual thinking is that it is not always activated. 200 In order for the 
juror to apply counterfactual thinking they likely would need to be 
instructed to do so. 201 
IV. CONCLUSION: WILL THE REAL REASONABLE PERSON PLEASE STAND 
UP? 
Think back to the beginning of this article and reimagine yourself as that 
average juror, hearing for the first time the following jury instructions on 
the negligence standard: 
A person is "negligent" when the person fails to exercise ordinary 
care. "Ordinary ca[r]e" is the care a reasonable person would use 
in similar circumstances. A person is negligent if the person, 
without intending to do harm, does something ( or fails to do 
something) a reasonable person would recognize as creating an 
unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or property.202 
196. Id. at 96-97. The mock jurors were instructed about ordinary negligence as defined by 
the Reasonable Person Standard, thus their self-supplied understanding of the standard of care 
did reflect instructions similar to those given to a real jury in most jurisdictions. Id. at 94. 
197. Roese, supra note 191, at 137. 
198. Id. 
199. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 591-92. 
200. Roese, supra note 191, at 135 (stating that counterfactual thinking may be activated 
most often when there is a personal negative emotional experience). 
201. See id. 
202. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at§ 120.02. 
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As someone without any legal training, how would you think about the 
terms "reasonably prudent person" and "ordinary care"? How would you 
apply these concepts when determining whether the defendant was 
negligent? Ultimately, how and what decision would you make? 
In many ways, despite its long and fruitful history, the reasonable person 
has largely remained an enigma. Legal scholars have debated precisely how 
to conceptualize the Reasonable Person Standard and the primary factors 
that are essential to determining negligence. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
focused on the Reasonable Person Standard as a standard requiring juries to 
evaluate the foreseeability of the harm.203 In contrast, Judge Learned Hand 
defined the Reasonable Person Standard as a cost-benefit analysis in which 
the level of harm, probability of the accident, and cost of taking precautions 
should all be weighed and balanced against each other to determine if there 
was negligence.204 Other legal scholars, such as Steven Hetcher, have taken 
a very different approach to the Reasonable Person Standard. He argues that 
jurors will intuitively use their own community norms when applying the 
Reasonable Person Standard. 205 All of these perspectives are insightful and 
add to the legal scholarship, especially in deciding how the Reasonable 
Person Standard should be applied. Unfortunately, there is a crucial 
component of the Reasonable Person Standard that is largely ignored in 
these perspectives: th~ influence of the jury. 
Juries play the crucial role of applying the Reasonable Person Standard 
in most cases. 206 Juries have the vital role of determining negligence, yet 
they are rarely given more instruction than that provided in the Federal Jury 
Practice Instructions example shown above.207 Additionally, what is 
provided lacks explicit instructions to examine the foreseeability of harm, 
do a cost-benefit analysis, or apply community norms. Instead, juries are 
left on their own to interpret and apply the standard-a standard that 
research has found is confusing to many jury members. 208 Given these 
circumstances, the fundamental question is how . are juries actually 
interpreting and applying the Reasonable Person Standard? 
To understand how juries are actually interpreting and applying the 
Reasonable Person Standard, scholars must get inside the heads of the 
jurors and examine their systematic decision-making processes. Although 
not the standard work of legal scholars, examining decision-making 
203. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 591. 
204. Posner, supra note 6, at 32. 
205. Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 20, at 878. 
206. Hetcher, The Jury's Out, supra note 66, at 633. 
207. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 4, at 595; supra text accompanying note 202. 
208. See Greene, Johns & Bowman, supra note 165. 
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processes is common work for social psychologists and there already exists 
a large body of social psychological research that would be extremely 
informative in understanding how jurors interpret and apply the Reasonable 
Person Standard. A small sampling discussed in this article include the 
research regarding Bounded Rationality, dual system processing, framing 
effects, the outcome bias, the hindsight bias, and counterfactual thinking. 
These are just a few examples from the area of judgment and decision-
making that show how cognitive processes could have unforeseen effects on 
the application of the Reasonable Person Standard. There are of course 
many other areas of social psychology that could be equally informative. 
For example, the research on group dynamics and group decision-making 
could be beneficial in understanding how jury members-as a group-
influence each other. Other research on stereotyping and prejudice could 
also be informative in providing an understanding of how characteristics of 
the plaintiff and defendant influence determinations of negligence. Thus, 
examining social psychological research findings could help legal scholars 
better understand how juries interpret and apply the Reasonable Person 
Standard. 
In addition to examining general social psychological principles, an 
understanding of jurors' interpretation and application of the Reasonable 
Person Standard could also be enhanced by doing new research specifically 
focused on jurors and addressing specific questions and concerns. For 
example, a study could examine the influence of different framings of the 
Reasonable Person Standard as either an affirmative duty or failure to 
exercise reasonable care. By doing this type of research, it would be 
possible to systematically examine how each of the academic perspectives 
influences juror decisions given the provided instructions. It would even be 
possible to do studies that manipulated the details of the instructions to 
determine what type of instructions creates more consistent and accurate 
outcomes depending on which perspective one wants to endorse. 
The reasonable person is likely to persist in American jurisprudence. As 
such, it is crucial that legal scholars and practitioners have a better 
understanding of how jurors interpret and apply the Reasonable Person 
Standard. Without this understanding, there is a glaring hole in the legal 
scholarship. Examining social psychology findings and conducting future 
research will allow us to get to know the real reasonable person as he or she 
actually exists in the context of juror decisions. So will the real reasonable 
person please stand up? 
